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CAPÍTULO 3 
PHILOSOPHICAL ASCESIS  
AND THE PACT OF INDIFFERENCE 
AROUND PETER SLOTERDIJK'S ‘ANTHROPOTECHNIC 




In a recent work entitled You must change your life, Peter Sloterdijk explores the prac-
tising nature of philosophy and predicts the return of the “immunological”. There is 
currently a growing demand for anthropotechnics able to strengthen our immune-
symbolic system (i.e. mental and physical methods that protect us against uncertainty, 
anguish, and death). The anthropotechnics that are being practiced worldwide, such 
as Yoga or Mindfulness, come originally from Indian philosophies and not from an-
cient Greek or Roman philosophy. Despite the work of historians of philosophy such 
as Pierre Hadot, the spiritual exercises of ancient Greco-Roman philosophy continue 
to be studied as fossilized specimens inside university classrooms. This could be due 
to the pact of indifference, the tacit agreement that lies behind the functioning of 
contemporary Institutional Philosophy. Thanks to this pact there is no longer any 
possible contradiction between life and work, because there is, to begin with, no vital 
commitment to the genuine exercise of philosophy. We assume that philosophy is an 
exclusively rhetorical exercise and that the task of the professional philosopher is to 
publish as many papers as possible in prestigious journals that tend to privatize kno-
wledge. Following a different daimon, this essay was conceived as an exercise in thin-
king outside the academic standards of professional philosophy. The resulting literary 
experiment has been intentionally kept as natural as possible, without disguising the 
crossroads of ideas, thinkers, doubts and new problems that arose spontaneously du-
ring the exercise. 
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1. WHEN THE MAP PREVENTS TRAVEL 
A metaphysics could be reborn as 
a science of ascetic limits 
RENÉ DAUMAL 
 
Lefeu, the painter of Jean Améry's novel, wants to save himself from 
success. Avoid it at all costs. He practices detachment from the world 
and refuses to be anything other than an anonymous artist, a survivor 
of culture. To create this character, Améry was inspired by the life of 
the Austrian painter Eric Schmid, who was so far removed from the 
circuits of commercialization of art he did not even bother to exhibit his 
works. His withdrawn, “monastic” life consisted of painting and wai-
ting. “The artists of our time”, writes Améry in 1959, “who do not per-
form any social function […] are the monks of our time. They are the 
only ones who fulfill the triple vow: poverty, it goes without saying, 
chastity in the face of the temptations of the world and obedience to the 
laws of art!” (2003, p.217). It would be more accurate to say that Sch-
mid took upon himself the vows of an “ascetic” life. The alcoholic be-
verages that Améry finds in the painter's room would be incompatible 
with the life of a monk. So it would be more accurate to say that the 
artists who practice detachment from the world and, who for this reason 
do not fulfill any social function, are not the monks but the ascetics of 
our time. Neither the austere life nor an existence dedicated to a sensible 
or supersensible ideal are the exclusive patrimony of religious ascetics or 
exercisers. When Nietzsche extols austerity in The Gay Science (185), 
affirming: “It is the poor who misunderstand his voluntary poverty”, or 
when he defends asceticism of the will, understood as the sublimation 
of instincts and values, he explicitly places himself in the antipodes of 
Christian ascesis, which Nietzsche considered, incidentally, a sickly en-
devour. Nietzsche is one of the figures who recovers the exercising, as-
cetic character of philosophy. Peter Sloterdijk considers him “the disco-
verer of ascetic cultures”: he reveals the Earth as an ascetic planet that 
harbors diverse anthropo-technical systems supported by opposite asce-
tologies. These systems, whether inscribed in sick or healthy ascetolo-
gies, or responding to more or less spiritual horizons, have to be 
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approached from an immunological-cultural front according to Sloter-
dijk. In the voluminous work happily entitled You must change your life, 
Sloterdijk exposes in detail the three immune systems that human 
beings are endowed with: the biological, the social and the symbolic. 
The first protects us from disease, the second from invasions, wars, so-
cial disorder; the third, on the other hand, protects us from the uncer-
tainty of existence, from anguish, from the absurd, from the fear of 
death. This third immune system provides us with a symbolic lair 
against suffering and emptiness and becomes a kind of existential refuge. 
To strengthen this system, what Sloterdijk calls “anthropotechnics” are 
used, rescuing this term from anthropological studies and defining them 
as “methods of mental and physical practising by which humans from 
the most diverse cultures have attempted to optimize their cosmic and 
immunological status in the face of vague risks of living and acute cer-
tainties of death” (2018, p.10). Each immune-symbolic system appears 
to be an ascetic planet unto itself, however, and there can be no such 
thing as a universal instruction manual for strengthening symbolic de-
fenses. The ascetic must learn to give himself the necessary conditions 
for his own exercise, especially when the social or even biological envi-
ronment seems harmful to his life purpose. In the particular case of 
Nietzsche, biological and symbolic immunity are especially related. This 
can be seen clearly in his correspondence. For example, when in the 
spring of 1876 he shares with Rodmunt the belief that fatigue and skep-
ticism are his greatest enemies: overcoming them implies recovering 
“the courage of health” (den Muth der Gesundheit). Although Nietzsche 
always maintained a good relationship with the University of Basel, 
which after his resignation assigned him a generous financial allowance, 
he was already beginning to consider himself a philosopher rather than 
a professor of philology: “now I dare to pursue wisdom myself and to 
be a philosopher myself; formerly I worshipped the philosophers”. 
(BVN-1878,729). Years later, in the spring of 1879, he wrote a letter to 
his friend Frank Overbeck explaining that Basel's “noxious and oppres-
sive” environment gave him headaches to the point that he could no 
longer tolerate reading and writing for more than twenty minutes. His 
conclusion seems decisive: “Ergo: Academia derelinquenda est”. (“There-
fore, Academy must be forsaken”; BVN-1879,837). At 34 years of age, 
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Nietzsche resigned from his position at the university due to continuing 
health problems that, curiously, did not prevent him from focusing on 
his philosophy. In fact, the most creative -and exercising- decade of his 
life starts at that moment. Did not Zarathustra have to sacrifice himself 
in order to preach among men, “descending into the depths”, and clim-
bing down alone from the mountains? Do not all men have to sink into 
their sunset before they can become overmen? But this is the imaginary 
of Nietzschean asceticism, and it is not necessary to adopt it to recognize 
in its vital commitment the universal sign of all ascetic rebellion. Con-
sider the case of the French poet and philosopher René Daumal, who 
was as indifferent to success as the painter Eric Schmid and as commit-
ted to the sunrise as Zarathustra. Pataphysic, founder of the avant-garde 
movement called “the Simplists” which was in open confrontation with 
the surrealist group of André Bretón, student of Sanskrit and Indian 
philosophy, disciple of Gurdjieff and unconditional lover of upaniṣadic 
non-dualism, his writings are the testimony of an intense vital exercise 
which does not seem to fit within the confines of his brief stay in the 
world –thirty-six years. Daumal, the poet-magician, embodies the ant-
hropotechnics of conscious writing and differentiates between white 
and black poetry as one does in magic. He also emphasizes the dis-
tinction between the map and the journey, – between the word and the 
ineffable–, to the point that he wonders if speech could provoke the 
experience of the unspeakable: 
Discursive philosophy is as necessary to knowledge as the geographical 
map is to travel. The great error, I repeat, is to believe that one can travel 
by looking at a map. When the problem of incitement to travel is posed, 
we can indeed wonder: is it possible to use a geographical map not only to 
guide, but also to provoke the trip? (1991,p.97) 
In a recent essay, the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben answered 
this question in the negative: the romantic attempt to unite work on 
oneself and the production of a work is doomed to failure. Daumal's 
life-work culminates in an unfinished novel, entitled Mount Analogue, 
for which he is timidly recognized in literary circles. A novel that re-
counts the journey of a group of friends towards a symbolic mountain, 
the meeting point between heaven and earth, with the aim of creating 
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another way of inhabiting the world, and therefore, of creating a new 
humanity. Regarding this work, Agamben wonders: 
Why does the work on oneself, which has to lead to spiritual liberation, 
need the work on an opus? If Mount Analogue materially exists, why 
give it the shape of a narrative fiction, which was initially presented as 
a “treatise of psychological mountaineering,” and which the author cer-
tainly did not care to include among the masterpieces of twentieth-cen-
tury literature? (2017, p.111-112) 
Following the voice of original philosophy, Daumal would reverse Aga-
mben's question: if Mount Analogue did not already exist in some form, 
why would he have felt the urge to write it? To what extent is it possible 
to separate life and work without losing the meaning of both? The 
Orientalists and Sanskritists of his time were reproached by this self-
taught student of Sanskrit: sic vos, non vobis, mellificatis, apes. (“Thus 
you, bees, make honey but not for yourselves”). Daumal directed this 
Latin verse, doubtfully attributed to Virgil, as a reproach to Jacques Ba-
cot, translator into French of the Tibetan text Life of Milarepa. In a more 
general way, Daumal aimed it at all the specialists who, losing themsel-
ves in the philological and rhetorical study of oriental texts, did not take 
seriously any of the ideas or ways of life reflected in these texts. This 
reproach has not lost an iota of its validity today. The institutions that 
administer the functioning and teaching of the humanities demand of 
their members a kind of “ascetic” work, if I may abuse the limits of this 
term, based on specialized research exercises –a kind of lifetime hyper-
repetition– which obeys the logic of an omnivorous production of “cog-
nitive capital” in the form of books, papers, and metapapers whose pu-
blication conditions, commercialized to the extreme, hardly seem to 
provoke ethical debates among professionals of philosophy. These exer-
cises are above all rhetorical in character, meaning by this that language 
becomes an end in itself. It is nothing new to affirm that institutionali-
zed philosophy has ended up being a conversation between specialists 
subscribed under a tacit and comfortable pact: that of absolute indiffe-
rence between life and work, i.e., between exercise and thought. Pierre 
Hadot has explained, in part, how a notion of philosophy has been 
reached historically that is so far removed from its original and etho-
– 79 – 
 
poietic impulse, and that is now understood as a mere speculative dis-
course divorced from all spiritual exercise. The spiritual exercises of an-
cient philosophy were the nucleus of a way of life practiced in commu-
nity and reveal what Sloterdijk calls its “self-educational pathos”: 
“Philosophy that would not have operated as a transformative exercise 
(askesis) would have remained suspect to its ancient acolytes also as a 
source of knowledge” (2013, p.10). 
Sloterdijk is right when he warns us of the return of the immunological, 
that is, of a growing social demand for anthropotechnics and exercises 
that can strengthen the immune-symbolic system. It is not about the 
return of religion, in the same way that the austere life of Schmid, Dau-
mal, or Nietzsche should not be understood automatically as a “monas-
tic” life. What there is, instead, is a more or less serious, more or less 
narcissistic return to ascetic practices and a revaluation of the exercising 
nature of human existence. Underneath this demand could be hidden a 
desire to sabotage the abusive role attributed to the map or to language, 
a desire that Sloterdijk makes explicit when recalling “Wittgenstein's 
well-known demand to put an end to the chatter about ethics” (2018, 
p.16). It is to Sloterdijk's merit that he includes, in the revision of the 
ascetic universe, Indian anthropotechnics, for the current study of In-
dian practices is often totally subordinated to philology, ethnography, 
sociology, or historiography. Among all these disciplines, the absence of 
a broad philosophical thought about the globalization of these practices 
and its contemporary relevance stands out. Let us bear in mind that 
these are exercises such as mindfulness or yoga, in its numerous models 
and manifestations, which today summon millions of practitioners of 
very different ages, cultures, and latitudes, and not the spiritual exercises 
of Greek or Latin philosophy. Often, these Indian anthropotechnics are 
rooted in metaphysics of renunciation that promote the definitive flight 
from existence and the world. Sloterdijk criticizes these ideas vigorously, 
ignoring that both the metaphysics and the exercises themselves have 
undergone a great transformation in their process of globalization. This 
social demand for anthropotechnics, however, does not affect the insti-
tutional course of philosophy, since the pact of indifference is subscribed 
equally in all domains of thought. And in this case, Indian philosophies 
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that involve spiritual exercises are no way an exception. They have en-
tered the university through a safe process of hyper-rationalization, as 
did, in their day, those Greek or Latin philosophies that also included 
beyond-textual exercises. While René Daumal wondered if the map 
could provoke the trip, it would be necessary to wonder to what extent 
the current map of institutional Philosophy prevents it. 
2. PHILOSOPHICAL ASCESIS AND THE PACT OF 
INDIFFERENCE 
We know as much as we do 
Novalis 
The Greek term 'askesis' does not appear in the New Testament. 
However, along with prayer, it becomes one of the central themes of 
later patristic literature. Once the figure of the monk internalizes that 
of the martyr, the true reference of the imitatio Christi, the “martyrdom 
of conscience” (conscientae martyrium, VA, 47.1) becomes the funda-
mental askesis. As Hadot has shown, from the second century apologists 
on, Christianity is presented as the true philosophy, and numerous te-
chniques from Greek philosophy start being redefined (2002, p.77). 
This resignification can already be found in the Hellenistic Judaism of 
Philo of Alexandria, especially in his work Allegorical Interpretation of 
which Hadot (2002, p. 26) highlights a list of practices, all inherited 
from ancient Greek philosophy. Readings (anagnôseis), meditations 
(meletai), self-control (enkrateia), recollection of what is good (tôn kalôn 
mnêmai), acts of worship (therapeïai), and the performance of duties are 
part of Jacob's training when he moves away from bodily passions. Ap-
plied now to the context of biblical Genesis, Philo seems to imply that 
these philosophical techniques are not sufficient by themselves, since 
finally it is up to God to make Jacob's soul migrate from the realm of 
passions. If in Platonic idealism the soul moves away from the sensible 
through union with itself (an experience that Plato calls ‘phronesis’; 
Phaedo, 79d), in Philo's religious interpretation, this exile is explained 
as a migration (metoikía) of the soul that is oriented towards God 
(Leg.Alleg. 3.18-19). To the aforementioned spiritual exercises we could 
add others such as the stoic prosoché (attention, vigilance), akroasis 
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(listening), or skepsis (deep examination). Hadot reclaims the expression 
“spiritual exercises” because their field of action is not only moral but 
above all existential, they promote “a transformation of the vision of the 
world and a metamorphosis of being”, and therefore they “involve the 
whole spirit” (2002, p.77). But then, Hadot emphasizes a striking dis-
tinction between “philosophical thought exercises” and a number of ot-
her seemingly non-philosophical practices: 
For the ancient philosophers, the word 'askesis' designates only spiritual 
exercises of which we have spoken, that is, an inner activity of thought 
and will. What exists in certain ancient philosophers, for example in the 
Cynics or Neoplatonists, alimentary or sexual practices, analogous to 
Christian asceticism, is another question. These practices are different 
from philosophical thought exercises. (Hadot, 2002, p.78) 
I wonder to what extent we can abstract these thought exercises from 
the way of life that they themselves require and demand. Each practicing 
life requires its own conditions insofar as it is oriented towards a specific 
purpose and is part of a specific circumstance. In his own version of 
philosophical asceticism, Epictetus points out that it is not about prac-
ticing anything randomly, in the style of the jugglers (Dis., 3.12, 1-4). 
Depending on the chosen purpose, the practitioner must seek the con-
ditions that make their exercise not only possible but also real. Does not 
the correct practice of Stoic attention require certain vital conditions 
inherent in the practice itself? Could we separate the Buddhist practice 
of the four foundations of mindfulness (satipaṭṭhānā) from the circum-
stances of the practitioner who embodies it? I am not appealing to any 
kind of correspondence or ethical harmony between what is thought, 
what is said, and what is done. Rather, I am wondering about the con-
ditions that make it possible to think and speak in a certain way, condi-
tions that provoke ways of thinking and speaking capable of fostering 
new ways of acting in the world. The relationship between exercise and 
life is so intimate that a change in vital conditions can alter the nature 
of an exercise; and the modification of the purpose to which it is direc-
ted also has an influence on life and technique. Let us take for example 
the anthropotechnic of inner watchfulness and vigilance, as it is applied 
in the Greek and Latin Stoa and the way in which Antony of Egypt 
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recommends it to his disciples in the desert. “When any image (visio) 
appears”, says Antony (or rather Athanasius), “do not promptly collapse 
with cowardly fear, but whatever it may be, first ask with stout heart, 
'Who are you and whence do you come?'” (VA, 43.1). The reader fami-
liar with Stoic epistemology, and with such an effort to keep an eye on 
the impressions (lat. phantasmata; visios) that come to mind, will notice 
a family resemblance in this recommendation of the Christian monk. 
The cited passage, in particular, refers us to Epictetus: “For as Socrates 
said, we ought not to live a life without examination, so we ought not 
to accept a representation (phantasían) without examination, but we 
should say: ‘Wait, let me see who you are and whence you come’. Like 
the sentinels: 'Show me the pass'” (Dis.,3.12; see also 3.8). Despite the 
apparent similarities, Saint Antony is teaching his disciples to protect 
themselves from demons and his classification of the impressions is 
quite simple: there are two kinds of mental images, angelic and demo-
nic. To learn to discern them, the disciple does not have to delve into 
the mechanism of his own mind or the value judgments that these ima-
ges trigger, but simply ask about the origin of these images and then pay 
attention to the sensation: “if it should be a vision of the good, they will 
reassure you and change your fear into joy” (VA, 43.2). In this reappro-
priation, the technique is simplified in the realm of thought while its 
complexity increases in another sense, since now the weight of self-exa-
mination is shifted to the realm of faith and intuitive communication 
with God. Both the ascetic life of the Christian monk and that of a Stoic 
like Epictetus are compromised by the kind of exercise to which they 
are engaged. And if the life of the monk is not incompatible with the 
application of certain techniques of thought, neither can philosophical 
asceticism be reduced to a series of techniques independent of the kind 
of life in which they are inscribed. This interrelation between life and 
exercise becomes much more explicit in the case of the practice of Budd-
hist vigilance. Concentration on the present moment is as fundamental 
in the Stoicism of Marcus Aurelius (Med., VII, 54) as in the teaching of 
Buddha: 
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Let not a person revive the past 
or on the future build his hopes. 
For the past has been left behind 
and the future has not been reached. 
Instead with insight let him see 
each presently arisen state; 
let him know that and be sure of it, 
invincibly, unshakably. 
Today the effort must be made; 
tomorrow Death may come, who knows? 
No bargain with Mortality 
can keep him and his hordes away, 
but one who dwells thus ardently, relentlessly, by day, by night –– 
It is he, the Peaceful Sage has said, 
who has had a single excellent night. 
 
(MN,131; trans. Bhikkhu Boddhi, 2015, p.1039) 
The excellent day or night (bhadekaratta) of the Buddhist is not the 
excellent day of the Stoic or the Christian monk. These three versions 
of self-vigilance, offered here as an outline, are adapted to different ideas 
and ways of life and the correct password for impressions will also be 
different in each case. Stoic attention conforms to the basic principles 
of Stoic philosophy, to the discernment between what concerns us and 
what does not, inscribed in a series of ideas about the cosmos and the 
human being. In the same way, Buddhist attention requires analytical 
thinking, a discernment that consists in putting into practice the ideas 
of the teaching preached by the Buddha. To apply this technique one 
must have given his/her assent to the three characteristics of existence 
(dissatisfaction, impermanence, the absence of essence or selfhood), to 
the five phenomena that constitute our empirical identity, to a specific 
interpretation of the law of cause and effect, and so on. This assent to 
the teaching, in the case of Buddhism, should not consist of mere blind 
acceptance nor should it consist of an uncritical reliance on tradition. 
To awaken to the truth (saccānubodha), one has first to trust the one 
who preaches the teaching by verifying that there is a correspondence 
between what he says and what he does, thus faith (saddhā) arises, and 
respect, attention, listening and then memorizing the teaching, after 
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which one proceeds to investigate the meaning of what has been memo-
rized. Only through reflective acceptance does the sufficient aspiration 
arise that leads the practitioner to the application of the will and to cri-
tical analysis, since it is this scrutiny that will determine his effort (tapas) 
and the quality of his immersion in the meditative practice of awakening 
(vipassanā). To discover the truth (saccānupatti), we are told in this 
middle discourse (MN, 95), what is decisive is the effort in meditative 
practice that is preceded by the critical analysis of the essential points of 
the teaching itself. This brief example already suggests that the four 
foundations of Buddhist mindfulness, as set out in the Pali Canon, have 
little to do with the contemporary mindfulness technique understood 
as training in “bare attention” largely unrelated from these ideas, and 
divorced from the purpose of spiritual liberation that was the essence of 
the original teaching. Once again, by changing the purpose, the practice 
itself changes and also the vital conditions that are required to exercise 
it. Under their original conditions, Buddhist meditation techniques 
probably would not have been globalized in the way that they have. Ins-
tead, they have undergone a series of philosophical simplifications in 
order to be adapted to almost universal contexts, to the point that their 
globalization has contributed to the preservation of these techniques as 
much as to their loss, or at least to their radical change. If the metaphysi-
cal ideas of the Śramaṇas, for example, about saṃsāra and definitive 
liberation, had not been reinterpreted –and in certain cases, suppressed– 
neither would yoga in its many styles and transformations be practiced 
today on a global level. In a way, it is these original ideas that lead Slo-
terdijk to present such a negative view of Indian anthropotechnics and 
to lose himself in historical and rather archaic treatments of castes and 
Indian society. Aurobindo Ghose already lucidly dealt with these ideas 
of renunciation in his writings and created an evolutionary model of 
yoga whose goal was set in service of the world. He did not give a new 
meaning to classical terms of the yogic tradition (for example: mokṣa) 
but directly understood that the goal of yoga could no longer be that kind 
of liberation. What bothers Sloterdijk is that same spirit of abandon-
ment of the world that animates many of the anthropotechnics of this 
ascetic universe, be they Buddhist, Christian, or Stoic. The tendency to 
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“recessive insularization” of the retreatants promotes the flight of the 
“ethically best”, something totally detrimental to the world itself. Follo-
wing Plotinus's command: give it all away! (aphele panta; Enn. V. 
3.[49].17,39), the voluntary exile of these “secessionists” –ascetics, me-
ditators, thinkers, and artists– leaves us alone in a world of experts. 
Owing to the exodus of the ascetics, meditators and thinkers, [the 
world] becomes the site of a drama that fundamentally questions its 
ability to house ethically aroused inhabitants sufficiently: what is this 
world if the strongest statement about it is a withdrawal from it? 
(2018,p.221) 
There are, however, two different types of secessionists: those who flee 
the world to work on themselves, and those who, being obsessively busy 
and active in the world, flee from themselves. It is the latter who seem 
to currently call for anthropotechnics to reinforce their immuno-sym-
bolic system. Although this “self-care” has suffered since modernity 
what Sloterdijk calls an “externalization” process, and perhaps it is being 
implemented superficially, the contemporary demand for symbolic re-
fuge does not deserve to be underestimated. The exodus of the ascetics 
happens in the outskirts of the world but ends up returning to its center 
as a mirror, our own mirror. Let's look at the list of eight exercises of 
Patañjali's Yoga. Each of these steps (aṅga) requires specific conditions 
and prepares the practitioner for the next step. The Yogasūtra says that 
the list can be reduced to seven exercises, but this in turn calls for new 
conditions. For example, to skip pratyāhāra, an exercise where attention 
is withdrawn from the senses, one must first have achieved mastery of 
the breath (prāṇāyāma), for which specific bodily conditions are requi-
red. Patañjali's aṣṭāṅga proposes a ladder of conditions aimed at 
reaching the ultimate samādhi, that is, the ultimate split between mind 
and consciousness, a liberating isolation called kaivalya. This model of 
yoga, strongly inspired by Buddhism, pursues the same “ontological sui-
cide” that characterizes the Śramaṇa metaphysics of renunciation (Ma-
llinson and Singleton, 2017, p.xiii). Sloterdijk relies solely on this idea 
to delve into the particular “secessionism” of Brahmanic and extra-Brah-
manic ascetologies. Only in this way can he consider Buddhism and 
Jainism as two “great systems of pessimism” or Indian spirituality as “the 
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planetary granary of narcissism”, (2018, pp. 267 and 262). The real task 
here, however, is to investigate how and why the anthropotechnics that 
arise from these extreme ideas of renunciation have come down to us 
softened in their eschatological content and empowered in their ethical 
content –how and why, in our day, practitioners are often more familiar 
with terms like saṃsāra, karma and mokṣa, than with Greek words like 
eudaimonía, aponía or ataraxía. Sloterdijk forgets to mention that 
thanks to the globalization of yoga schools, today millions of people 
who probably have no interest in seeking a definitive exit from the 
world, – and who may not have heard of Marcus Aurelius's Hyponmen-
ata–, know and study that list of eight yogic exercises. Patañjali's astāṅga 
yoga, having undergone an important reinterpretation process 
throughout history, is used as a global initiation base to yoga. Does this 
have something to do with the “power of return” inherent in antiquity? 
Sloterdijk (2018, p.32) mentions this power when dealing with Nietzs-
che's contemporaneity: “[…] antiquity has no need of repetitions enac-
ted in subsequent periods, because it 'essentially' returns constantly on 
its own strength”. The definitive renunciation that is at the base of this 
“classic” model of yoga is not a common ontological suicide, but a very 
particular and difficult one to carry out. Paradoxically, it requires great 
attention to vital conditions and a major effort aimed at transforming 
the very nature of the mind. In fact, it is the antipodes of ordinary sui-
cide as we commonly understand it. The first two astāṅga exercises lay 
the ethical foundations for this path to isolation, and consist of ten pre-
cepts –yamas and niyamas– partially borrowed from Jainism (Ācārāṅga 
Sūtra, 3rd century BCE), whose fundamental premise is non-violence. A 
suicide whose basic requirement is non-violence has more to do with 
raising awareness than with “raising a hand at oneself” –the title of a 
brilliant essay by Jean Améry on voluntary death. Due to their Buddhist 
influence, the Yoga aphorisms also adopt the four brahmavihārās or no-
ble thoughts of Buddhist ethics: friendship (maitrī), joy (muditā), com-
passion (karuṇa) and equanimity (upekṣa). The ethical exercise is ap-
plied here in a double sense, emphasizing the psychosomatic 
relationship between action and thought: on the one hand, living accor-
ding to these precepts brings as a consequence mental clarity (citta-
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prasāda; YS, 1.33), on the other hand, meditating on them awakens 
strength (bāla) in the practitioner (YS, 3.23). Simply retaining the me-
taphysical ideas associated with renunciation, and forgetting the ethical 
component of these practices, seems too easy a route to philosophical 
escapism. To reduce Buddhism to a “nihilistic” system is not only to 
ignore Buddha's own arguments against this accusation, but to ignore 
the fact that the world today would be much worse –much more nihi-
listic, no doubt– if Buddhist meditation or Patañjali's yoga were margi-
nal practices, instead of being an almost universal refuge to which one 
goes urgently. To begin with, the practices to which śramaṇic me-
taphysics has given rise, attenuated and reconverted to therapy, camou-
flaged and adapted to current demands, constitute the main anthropo-
technics of our times and not the therapy of desire of the ancient 
philosophers of Greece and Rome. These Indian exercises require dis-
cernment and analytical application of certain philosophical ideas about 
life, the cosmos, and the human being: they have little to do with closing 
your eyes and throwing yourself into the gutter of emptiness. Of course, 
the practice of meditation or yoga does not guarantee any moral virtues, 
nor does the practice of logical and analytical thinking have the power 
to create good human beings. Goodness –or what is good– remains a 
mystery of human nature: there is no recipe, no practice or theory, that 
alone can safely lead us to that goal. Arindam Chakrabarti (2003) has a 
wonderful text on the triple relationship between yogic meditation, 
ethics and analytical thinking, so we leave the interested reader in his 
hands. 
In the case of the exercises of Greek and Roman philosophy, we cannot 
speak of any “evolution” or “involution” of them, since they have not 
been subjected to any significant innovation. The contemporary “redis-
covery” of ancient philosophical experience –thanks to the works of Ha-
dot, Rabbow, Foucault, Nussbaum, and many others– has not renewed 
the academic environment of philosophy, but rather these exercises have 
been subjected to academic treatment. Inside a university classroom, 
spiritual exercises are studied as fossilized specimens rather than as living 
self-pedagogical tools. My intuition is that this has to do with the pact 
of indifference between life and thought that underlies the profession of 
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the specialist. The requirement of specialization in institutional philo-
sophy focuses on the study and compilation of information, and aims 
to relate said information with the greatest erudition and originality 
possible, without the need to make any use of said information for life 
(something which was already common in the times of Epictetus; Dis., 
3.21, 8-11). As it is often an exclusively rhetorical exercise, this pact of 
indifference towards the private and personal life of the expert is impli-
cit. This tacit pact annuls any possible contradiction between life and 
work, since there is, from the outset, no vital commitment to thinking, 
but a normalized split between the hand that thinks and the hand that 
breathes. If we admit with Agamben that the writing of a work is not 
synonymous with the personal fulfillment of its creator, without this 
desire and this will for inner fulfillment it is difficult to influence the 
world and society. Ideas have the power to change social behavior, but 
this power must first shake the life of those who engender them. Other-
wise, the words begin and end as a dream in debt. All the voices that are 
currently clamoring for a revolution within the academy, and for a re-
newal of institutional philosophy, seem to reclaim a use of thought and 
speech projected towards social problems and extirpated from the natu-
ral narcissism towards which all rhetoric tends. For this communion 
between philosophy and society to take place, a much more intimate 
reconciliation must first happen between one's life and the work of phi-
losophy. As long as the breathing hand is not compromised with the 
thinking hand, philosophical ascesis will remain a merely rhetorical 
exercise. 
Nothing guarantees, however, that yoga or the anthropotechnics of In-
dian philosophy will not go through the same process of hyper-rationa-
lization that Greek and Latin spiritual exercises went through inside the 
academy. There was a time when philosophy was the servant of theology 
(ancilla theologiae), today, similarly, it is subjected to institutional rules 
that are designed for the sciences and that inevitably turn the practice 
of philosophy into a kind of humanistic engineering whose results are 
measured with quantitative criteria. This implies that the only legiti-
mate approach to study is the one that adjusts to those parameters, even 
when approaching texts, experiences, realities, that are not themselves 
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scientific or do not understand knowledge as contemporary science 
does. In addition, as a result of this servility to science, every philosophy 
professional tacitly consents to subject her thinking to the same writing 
guidelines. Apparently, what we think must be independent of how we 
write it, since in order for something to be ‘scientific’ philosophy, it 
must yield to a ready-made template that is the same for all disciplines. 
Whoever wants to publish philosophy in a format other than ‘scientific’ 
prose will find few prestigious journals willing to publish it Instead, the 
professional philosopher must follow the homogeneous script of scien-
tific papers that serves both for writing about chemistry and writing 
about Giordano Bruno's dialogues. This absurd imposition is counter-
productive to the very exercise of philosophy: it limits creative thinking, 
hijacks our narrative capacity, and ends up hindering our ability to read 
–thus, it damages the three spiritual exercises par excellence. And in this 
scientific exercise of philosophy, language, turned into an end in itself, 
endures the greatest losses. 
3. PHILOSOPHIA-MUNDI: SIC VOS, NON VOBIS… 
I understood then that Nietzsche had sought me out 
to get out of his texts, to take long paces along its margins. 
 
María Gabriela Llansol 
The close relationship between life and practice is made explicit in many 
yoga treatises. In the medieval treatises of Haṭha yoga, for example, we 
hardly find philosophical or metaphysical doctrines but rather lists of 
respiratory, corporal, energetic exercises, etc., all oriented to spiritual 
liberation and the obtaining of powers (siddhis). Often these powers at-
tract much more attention from researchers than the preconditions for 
obtaining them. The Śiva saṃhitā (3.35-41; 5.3-8), the Gheraṇḍa 
saṃhitā (5.23-31) or the Haṭha yoga pradīpikā, expose exhaustive lists 
about what the yogi should eat, what attitudes and what company he 
should cultivate and avoid, etc. Why should not certain philosophical 
exercises require a series of similar conditions? If Epicurus teaches a phi-
losophy that aims at ataraxia, the pleasure (hedone) which forms the 
cornerstone of his teaching must be forcibly sustained in a frugal life, 
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for only a moderate life can create the necessary conditions for it to be 
an uninterrupted pleasure that does not disturb the mind. The rule of 
life (kanon) is so closely linked with his philosophical teaching that we 
cannot say where his life routine ends and where the properly “philoso-
phical” exercise begins. Similarly, to practice the yoga of the Bhagavad 
Gītā, described as “skill in action” (BG, 2.50) and based on “equani-
mity” (BG, 2.48), the yogi should not eat much or little, he does not 
have to sleep much or little, and there are certain nutritional, ethical and 
social conditions to attend to. These vital conditions are not accidents 
separated from ideas, but are the sine qua non for thought to develop in 
one direction and not in another. Both yogic meditation and Platonic 
recollection of the soul require certain conditions, just as Plotinus's En-
neads are not the result of abstract circumstances, nor are they the fruit 
of the kind of life that Caligula led. It is common sense –if we can appeal 
to this rare friend– that Plato arrives in Syracuse and observes that a way 
of life based on excess is not compatible with the philosophy that he 
believes in and that he teaches/practices: “With such habits, nobody un-
der the sun who had followed this path since childhood could ever de-
velop any sense –no one is tempered by so admirable nature– nor would 
anyone ever be likely to become moderate” (L.VII, 326c). In fact, Plato 
is thinking about the conditions that a republic requires of its citizens; 
if those from Syracuse are to become sensible and prudent, Plato sug-
gests, they better strive to change their lives. Regardless of whether this 
Seventh Letter can or cannot be legitimately attributed to Plato, the so-
cial conditions demanded by the Platonic ideal republic are a reflection 
of the conditions of his own philosophy, which in turn would have been 
fatal to other practising lives, for example, to the philosophy of the Cy-
nics.  
Hadot himself argues that we cannot separate philosophical thought 
from the way of life in which it is embodied: “Philosophical discourse is 
part of the way of life. But, on the other hand, we must recognize that 
the philosopher's choice of life determines his discourse” (1995, p.21.) 
Therefore, his distinction between ascetic practices related to eating, 
sleeping, or sexual practices, and “philosophical” exercises, makes sense 
only if what is sought is to distinguish the monastic life from the ascetic 
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life of the philosopher. We have already indicated that not all asceticism 
is of a religious nature. But under these distinctions is hidden the danger 
of abstracting the philosophical practice from the vital conditions that 
are inherent to it. There is something that all ascetics –religious, artistic, 
philosophical, or of any other kind– inevitably share: their lives are com-
mitted to the exercise itself. The life of the practitioner must be, by 
force, alien to any pact that isolates what s/he does from what s/he is. 
The exercise of the philosopher, however diverse it may be, should re-
present no exception here. 
Jean Améry ends up feeling ashamed of himself when trying to steer his 
ascetic friend, the painter Eric Schmid, down the road to success: 
“Shame because we were unable to embrace monastic life, because we 
decided to live in this century […] shame because we stood before a 
type of life that has never known the concept of falsehood, while 
ours…” (2003, p.219). What Améry so honestly describes is the shame 
of someone who has learned to live by doing something that s/he is not 
committed to being. The real mistake, however, is to believe that this 
commitment is an exclusive feature of “monastic life”. What kind of 
philosophical exercise this misunderstanding may give rise to, especially 
when it turns out to be a consensual error promoted by the institutions 
that administer philosophy, is something that practitioners of philoso-
phy will have to ponder with themselves. But as long as there is no co-
llective will to break with the assumptions that support the pact of in-
difference, the verse Sic vos, non vobis, mellificatis ... will continue to be 
the hidden sentence – the potential motto – behind so many rhetorical 
discourses held in the name of a PowerPoint-wisdom. 
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